Monthly Archive for August, 2011

The Individual and the Collective in Rick Perry’s Oeuvre

Rick Perry has deftly (and quite tardily) positioned himself as the reigning champion of states’ rights and the so-called Tenther movement, which holds that most everything the federal government does is unconstitutional and should be left to the states. In his radical manifesto published last year, Fed Up, he reveals his antipathy to all sorts of federal functions: education spending, federal bank regulation, environmental regulation, Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security. Of course all of these positions are contingent upon the demands of good ol’ political opportunism:

In one of his more well-publicized shifts, Mr. Perry proclaimed that gay marriage was an issue for individual states to decide, but backtracked in recent weeks and now says he supports a federal amendment banning gay marriage. He has also signaled support for various federal actions to restrict abortion rather than leaving the issue to states. And he used $17 billion in federal stimulus money to balance the state’s last two budgets.

But hypocrisy aside, I will attribute to him his stated maximalist position:

“From marriage to prayer, from zoning laws to tax policy, from our school systems to health care, and everything in between,” he wrote, “it is essential to our liberty that we be allowed to live as we see fit through the democratic process at the local and state level.”

But the question today is, is that really the essence of liberty? To be free to be coerced by your local and state government?

The Libertarian party does not think so. In its platform it does not distinguish between levels of government when it comes to encroachment on individual liberty:

[A]ll political parties other than our own grant to government the right to regulate the lives of individuals and seize the fruits of their labor without their consent.

We, on the contrary, deny the right of any government to do these things, and hold that where governments exist, they must not violate the rights of any individual….

In this view, there is the individual and arrayed against him and his inviolable liberty is government, period. There is nothing special or priviliged about the liberty one enjoys within arbitrary geographic and legal jurisdictions we call “states.” To Libertarians, the regulation of private lives and the seizing of fruits of labor are not made appreciably more tolerable or noble by the fact that it’s being done from Perry’s state house instead of the White House.

Perry is clearly no libertarian. His view, consistent with the Tenther cult, is that there is something necessarily odious and despotic about federal coercion, but something pure and patriotic about state and local coercion. So Social Security is a Ponzi scheme, but retirement pensions for Texas public employees, partially paid for by taxpayers, is fine. Likewise, the EPA is some kind of envirofascist hotbed, but the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality does all sorts of things, all of which are presumably ok with Rick Perry.

I understand the philosophical case made by the Libertarian party. I disagree with a bunch of it, but I understand it. They have an ideological committment to protect the natural rights of the individual as against all collectives. They are not out to discover best governing practices or to optimize the efficacy of public policy. Presumably they think that their societal scheme is superior to all others, but the principle of individual inviolabity ultimately overrides any questions of practicality or efficacy. Fine.

The purist Rick Perry/states’ rights view I do not understand. (Leaving aside, of course, those areas in which that purity falls risibly short.) They do not claim to be individual rights champions. They openly say that their conception of liberty is endowed and ensured by a collective, in this case, the thing we call states. Perry says “it is essential to our liberty that we be allowed to live as we see fit,” but he doesn’t stop there, for his type of liberty is only derived “through the democratic process at the local and state level.”

But surely one’s definition of liberty should be universal, right? It can’t possibly be limited to the existence of a certain type of sub-national governing mechanism. Singapore, for instance, has no meaningful sub-national governance. Does this mean Singaporeans can never hope to know the sweet essence of liberty?

If, like Perry, you’ve already admitted that divining the collective will is a necessary precondition for liberty, then how we define the size and scope of that collective should not be a matter of dogma, but of pragmatism and efficacy. To pick a highly contingent and arbitrarily-sized collective—a “state” or a “municipality”—and say that it’s not just the optimal unit of collective human governance but the only means by which an individual can obtain liberty, makes absolutely no sense to me. Once you say collectives are necessary, you should be agnostic on the question of which collectives are best able to deal with various policy problems. It seems beyond obvious to me that sometimes the state or local collective will innovate, incubate, and administer best practices, and sometimes the federal collective will be the place to turn for optimal outcomes, efficiencies of scale, etc. Why people are hostile to that basic idea is tough for me to understand. We can and should have big debates about where we think problems will be best dealt with, but to say the answer is “always the states” because, well, a state’s a state, doesn’t seem to me to be the best strategy.

Here’s a good example. Matt Yglesias calls attention to one Cato scholar’s view that federal monitoring and tracking of hurricanes is illegitimate. Ok. So Matt wonders what the likely outcome would be if federal funding was eliminated for the National Weather Service and for all related weather-disaster entities. The abandoned functions, being really useful and important, would be picked up by someone else. Who?

Maybe the Gulf Coast states who are most often afflicted by hurricanes would form a consortium to do the monitoring and there would be constant disputes between the members about what constitutes a fair share of the budget to contribute. States further up the northeastern coast that are only rarely afflicted would try to free ride. Hurricanes asides, instead of having a single National Weather Service tracking the weather, maybe we’d have three or four private firms all reproducing each others’ data and selling it to clients. We’d have systematically higher costs and maybe (?) a slightly higher quality product.

I think the state-based or state consortium scenario is most likely. But would Louisiana or Mississippi’s weather monitoring system be prone to cutbacks during economic downturns? Would they stop monitoring after the threatening weather had passed their jurisdiction? Who would pay the overtime if Louisiana’s weather monitors had to stay late to keep New Jersey residents abreast of the latest data? Lots of collective action problems to sort out here.

When it comes to the question of whether hurricane monitoring should be a federal function or a state-based or private function, the relevant policy question isn’t “which view most comports with my philosophical biases or my idiosyncratic interpretation of the 10th amendment,” it’s, “which option will do the most reliable and cost-effective job at monitoring hurricanes.”  As Matt says, we have a well-functioning federal agency that does this, “it seems to work quite well and be useful to people, to municipalities, to states, etc. So why complain?” Why indeed.

Despite the current polls, I really don’t think Rick Perry will win the nomination. He hasn’t been a national politician long enough, and because he’s not very smart, he’ll blow it. But his Tenther legacy of irrational federal antipathy will surely live on.

Kurdistan Prognosis: There Will Be Blood

I’ve been remiss in my self-assigned responsibility to be the generalist political blogosphere’s foremost unknown source of all things Kurdistan. I suppose this is similar in scope to the Flight of the Conchords’ ambition to be "New Zealand’s fourth most popular guitar-based folk-parody duo."

Anyway, in the past, I haven’t been particularly sanguine when it comes to the resolution of the final status of disputed territories in the north of Iraq. That’s not changing today.

As I noted here and here, these disputed areas—which lie within the three border provinces of Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala—contain a volatile religious and ethnic mix of Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens, all having powerful internal or regional advocates, all wary of administrative control under the other, and all feeling they have some historical or demographic claim to the land. A constitutionally-mandated referendum to decide whether these areas will be incorporated into the Kurdistan region or remain under Baghdad’s administrative control has been delayed many times. The various factions continue to argue over the details of implementation, while Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government continue to navigate the fraught questions regarding the precise nature and scope of Kurdish "autonomy" in the new Iraq.

The real prize is Kirkuk, which is believed to contain 40% of Iraq’s total oil reserves. Although all oil revenue is shared between Kurdistan and the rest of Iraq according to a defined ratio based on population (17/83%), Baghdad is keenly aware of the Kurds’ longstanding nationalist ambitions, and with Kirkuk’s oil under its administrative control, the dream of an independent Kurdistan becomes a whole lot more economically viable.

Over the decades there has been much bloodshed over these issues of demography and oil in Kirkuk. In Foreign Policy, Sean Kane notes that the mutual antipathy is alive and well, and with the ongoing withdrawal of the U.S. military, it’s likely that more violence is on the way:

The United States’ military participation in the 22 combined checkpoints across the disputed territories in northern Iraq formally ended on August 1. This was an important event because peacekeeping and conflict prevention in Kirkuk and other territories disputed between Baghdad and Erbil have frequently been cited as among the key stabilizing roles that the U.S. military plays in Iraq. And the tripartite Combined Security Mechanism (CSM) of the U.S. military, Iraqi Army, and Kurdish peshmerga did increase coordination between Iraqi government and Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) security forces while serving as a credible crisis management mechanism. It now faces a leap into the unknown without the U.S. glue that has held it together so far.

Kane notes that there have been a series of clashes in the disputed areas between the Iraqi Army and the Kurdish peshmurga, with each attempting to use military force to establish new facts on the ground, pushing the territorial and administrative boundaries in their favor ahead of any future referendum. Kane says that the Kurds may be wise to push the envelope now, as their political power and military clout may be at its apex. The Kurdish parties represent a crucial piece of Prime Minister al-Maliki’s governing coalition, and for this reason al-Maliki has been reticent to challenge or criticize Kurdish peshmurga actions in the disputed territories. And while in the past the Kurdish military forces have been seen as better trained and equipped than the Iraqi national forces, the gap has been narrowing and the two are now near parity. 

A descent into violence so soon after the U.S. military’s departure would really be a terrible development, and would likely augur the reactivation of all sorts of sectarian strife throughout the country. We saw some of this just this week, which is dour reminder that there isn’t exactly a shortage of homicidal grievances about the place.

The issue in the north is the same as it ever was: The Kurds not only have a century of repression, forced displacement, and genocide to validate their territorial claims, but they also have legitimate constitutional grievance regarding the interminable delays in the census-and-referendum process. For their part, the minority Arabs and Turkmen in the disputed areas are very wary of waking up one day and finding themselves under Kurdish jurisdictional control. Baghdad is also worried that this whole process will turn out to be a de facto Kurdish oil grab, inching them ever-closer to their dream of full independence. Meanwhile, regional powers Iran and Turkey, with their own restive Kurdish populations, are not at all interested in seeing the Kurds of Iraq accrue any more power or autonomy than they already have.

I feel like I end all of my Kurdistan posts with the same ominous resignation; but once again, the Kurdish question is as vexing as ever, and particularly with diminishing American involvement, I find it very unlikely that the final dispensation of northern Iraq will come without more bloodshed.

The Dream of the Forever Majority

Ross Douthat had a very astute column yesterday on something that’s been bothering me as well; how national politicians govern as if the dream of a permanant realignment of the electorate in their favor is always right around the corner:

This dream has hovered over national leaders from Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan to Bill Clinton and Newt Gingrich. But it has loomed larger in the last decade, as our politics have grown more polarized and our country has suffered through a series of dislocations and disasters. Events like 9/11 and the Great Recession have persuaded partisans on both sides that a dramatic realignment is imminent; the breadth of the ideological divide has convinced them that it’s necessary. […]

Thus the assumption, on the left and right alike, that every presidential election is the most important in our lifetime — except for the next one, which will be more important still. […]

The dream of realignment has become the enemy of [political compromise]. It inspires politicians to claim sweeping mandates from highly contingent victories…. The losers, meanwhile, wax intransigent, while hoping for a realignment of their own. After all, why cut a deal today if tomorrow you might overthrow your rivals permanently? […]

None of this means that our parties need to give up their deep convictions, their grand plans, or their hopes of winning an enduring mandate.

But in the wake of the weekend’s downgrade, we need them to govern as though that final victory might never quite arrive.

This is good stuff. Washington is often accused of suffering from the dreaded “short-termism” with its inability to plan or focus on anything outside of a couple years’ time frame. Part of the reason of course is that we have a ton of elections every few years, and being a major officeholder seems to be enticing enough that no one really wants to give it up once they’ve got it. But most incumbents are in very safe seats so political survival can’t explain all of it.

No, I imagine Douthat is right that there is an apocalyptic tinge to the fevered anticipation and triumphalism of political operatives and officeholders. They really think that if they just play everything perfectly this time around, then the next election may just be the final decisive battle in the great partisan war for America’s soul. In their minds the zeitgeist is always forever on the brink of realizing that it was their party, all along, whom they really loved.

I remember Republicans and pundits confidently assert that the Bush victory in 2004 heralded an evangelical awakening that signalled a new normal in American politics. Four years later that was over of course, and the Democrats’ decisive triumph of the White House and Congress was the dawning of a new liberal age, buttressed by permanent ethnic demographic shifts and the newly-emboldened  youth vote. Well, that’s kind of over with as well.

Now we’re back to the trenches, with the White House and all of Congress up for grabs next year. We’ve learned that evangelicals can’t move elections on their own; and on the other side, while hispanic demographics are to some extent destiny, and young attitudes on various social issues will be dispositive, it’s not always easy to predict how all the spoils will be distributed.

I think one of the most recent examples of fatal short-termism was in 2009, when Republicans famously refused to negotiate or compromise during the health care reform debate. They calculated that total opposition and obstruction would help them in the upcoming midterms. They were certainly right about that, but in return for their sweeping House victory they got a comprehensive universal health law which they had no hand in influencing or shaping. Why did they trade seemingly transitory gains in one midterm election for a major defeat on a historic piece of substantive policy?

I think it’s because Ross is right: they never, ever believe the gains are transitory. They genuinely think there is a zero-sum struggle out there, and if they just accumulate enough points they’ll be crowned champion of the public square for good, their political enemies having gone the way of the Whigs. No one ever comes into power thinking that they’ve just inherited a very contingent, unsteady majority that is just as likely as not to be coughed up in a couple years.

Here’s a graph showing political party control in Congress and the White House:  PartyControlDebt

The presidency is very volatile. In Congress there are some sustained periods of party domination (I did not realize that the Democrats controlled the House and Senate for a quarter century beginning in 1955), but, whatever caused that prolonged stability is clearly not operative any longer (and this chart ends in 2007).

It’s just a fact that a first-past-the-post voting system militates toward a two-party consolidation, and in the long run, the parties adapt their platforms such that something near a 50-50 split is likely. As Ross notes, true permanent transformative shifts are quite rare; and in any event, the presidency seems to be exempt from them. What a party assumes is a historical realignment is most likely a very temporary triumph which will be stifled and attenuated by powerful veto points thoughout the rest of the system. I don’t know how to get politicians to govern as if this were the case; as long as they still have visions of permanent revolution and ultimate triumph, there isn’t much reason to be optimistic about the political system’s ability to forge collective action on big problems.

Housing Policy and Regulatory Barriers to Happiness

An interesting piece from AP on the emptying out of rural America:

Rural America now accounts for just 16 percent of the nation’s population, the lowest ever. […] Barring fresh investment that could bring jobs…large swaths of the Great Plains and Appalachia, along with parts of Arkansas, Mississippi and north Texas, could face significant population declines. […]

“Many rural areas can’t attract workers because there aren’t any jobs, and businesses won’t relocate there because there aren’t enough qualified workers. So they are caught in a downward spiral.”

So who is benefitting from all this anti-rural migration?

While rural America shrinks, larger U.S. metropolitan areas have enjoyed double-digit percentage gains in population over the past several decades. Since 2000, metros grew overall by 11 percent with the biggest gains in suburbs or small- or medium-sized cities. […]

“People like to ‘have it all’ — affordable housing in a smaller-town setting but in close proximity to jobs and big-city amenities such as specialized shopping, cultural events and major sports and entertainment venues,” [said Brookings Institution scholar William Frey.]

“Many moderate-sized metro areas can fulfill all of these needs,” he said.

What I’ve learned from reading about urban development issues is that where people choose to live often has less to do with their true deep-down lifestyle preferences, and more to do with specific public policy decisions that make certain types of built environments more common and viable than others.

Just because the biggest population gains have come in smaller metro areas and surrounding suburbs, doesn’t necessarily mean that people consider this particular arrangement as “having it all.” People certainly want access to big-city amenities and to be in close commuting distance to a well-paying job, but the fact that small cities and suburbs have seen more growth than large cities only proves that the supply of new housing is stagnant in the latter and expanding in the former.

Phoenix, Raleigh, Las Vegas, Atlanta, and pretty much every metro area in Texas saw massive growth the last decade. We’re talking 20-40%. (Here’s a good chart for percent growth figures for 2000-2010). Conversely, big old legacy cities Boston, New York, and Chicago all grew very modestly, 3-4%.

What separates the first group from the second is not that there are some great secret cultural amenities in Atlanta that are absent in Manhattan. It’s the fact that the first group features an abundance of undeveloped land and an immense amount of new housing stock. It’s not that people “prefer” suburbs and small cities located in the South and West, it’s just that that’s where the regulation and development environment favors the robust construction of new housing which puts downward pressure on home prices.

Now of course there’s not going to be a sudden building binge in downtown NYC or the Back Bay of Boston. Smaller underdeveloped metro areas will always grow faster than the old established cities which are already quite dense and nearer to saturation. But some of these big cities could be doing a whole lot more to attract new young, educated residents by tweaking their regulatory and zoning environment to promote new housing and higher density growth.

Here in Washington, DC, not only do we have the Height Act which artificially suppresses housing supply—and therefore the city’s tax revenue base—but to homeowners in affluent urban cores, “having it all” often means not much more than protecting the value of their real estate asset by encouraging anti-growth regulations in their neighborhood. Or else it is NIMBY warriors who fight urban redevelopment under the guise of preserving some immutable aesthetic “character” of their street, or on the grounds that new buildings must for some reason be architecturally “compatible” with the buildings around it.

These sorts of anti-growth agendas inflate the cost of housing for everybody, and the restrained supply keeps otherwise willing future residents away. That they choose to go to lower-cost small cities and suburbs does not mean they prefer the attendant small-city or suburban lifestyle so much as they are constrained in their choices due in part to anti-development land-use policies in established cities.

Matt Yglesias writes about this stuff all the time (and in fact has a forthcoming book on the topic). Recently he blew up the canard of “aesthetic compatibility” by noting that in practice, large ultra- modern designs look pretty damn cool when juxtaposed with older historic and traditional architecture. He gives the example of the famous Dancing House in Prague:

Likewise, one of the more iconic and striking views in Boston is that of Trinity Church abutting the Hancock Tower:

It would be rather insane to have suggested to I.M. Pei that his design for the tower ought to conform to the Romanesque revivalist style so as to blend with the prevailing character and scale of the neighborhood. Yet one hears these sorts of sentiments from urban zoning authorities every single day.

Things are so bad in Annapolis, MD, that due to the onerous zoning and building codes, there exists the bizarro situation in which it would currently be illegal to reconstruct the much-admired downtown area today.

Of course, you cannot escape land-use regulatory hell just by moving to the suburbs. There again, what people take for aesthetic preference may be nothing more than status-quo bias in the face of decades of mandatory zoning regulations. Charlie Gardner of The Old Urbanist blog recently wrote a fascinating piece on the scourge of the American front lawn. Now, if one chooses to set aside an expanse of land at the front of their home and fill it up with decorative non-functional turf, good for them I suppose. But in most every jurisdiction in the country, you have no choice in the matter. Mandatory setback requirements for houses are ubiquitous, along with density requirements, street width requirements, and yes, even front lawn requirements. Behold the poor woman from Oak Park, MI, who decided she wanted to uproot her front lawn and plant a large vegetable garden instead:

[Julie] Bass’ cool garden has landed her in hot water with the City of Oak Park. Code enforcement gave her a warning, then a ticket and now she’s been charged with a misdemeanor. […] “That’s not what we want to see in a front yard,” said Oak Park City Planner Kevin Rulkowski. Why? The city is pointing to a code that says a front yard has to have suitable, live, plant material. The big question is what’s “suitable?” […]

“If you look at the definition of what suitable is in Webster’s dictionary, it will say common. So, if you look around and you look in any other community, what’s common to a front yard is a nice, grass yard with beautiful trees and bushes and flowers,” he said.

Absent any choice, Gardner shows what all of these ordinances and regulations mean for the aesthetic of many American suburbs (this one outside of Nashville, TN):

He notes: A 35-foot roadway with 40-foot setbacks. This despite the fact that the street is a cul-de-sac and has virtually no traffic to “buffer” against. No wall, fence or hedge interrupts the Olmstedian pastoral aesthetic of the endless meadow (and would be very expensive to construct or plant at this scale, anyways). The backyard is much smaller than it might otherwise be due to the large setback.

He compares the meadowed American suburb to newer single-family suburbs in Europe, which look quite different without the setbacks and the lawns. This from outside Paris:

image

He notes: A 14-foot roadway and 10-foot setbacks, with garages tastefully integrated into house facades. Setback areas have been enclosed by walls, fences or hedges, and made into functional patios ornamented by planter boxes.  A spacious and private yard lies behind the home. There are no rear alleys. This simple design, of which there must be hundreds of thousands of examples in Paris alone, would be illegal under every American zoning code.

There are many more examples in his post. Again, the idea is not to just compare the competing aesthetic choices, but to recognize that there often is no choice, and so what we’ve got cannot simply be attributed to entrenched preference.

Finally, I’ll just note that rural America can never truly die. Like a zombie, it can only remain undead. That’s because no matter how low the population falls in the Great Plains and Appalachia, the affected states will all still have two senators, with the same oversized power to distort national regulatory policy and steer federal funds to favor their remaining constituents’ parochial rural interests. The Economist has a good graphic showing how these undead states have benefited financially from their overrepresentation in Congress. Their senators will always be adept at selling the myth of the agrarian American paradise as something that needs to be treasured and preserved at all costs, no matter how many people continue to abandon the myth for, ahem, greener pastures.

It’s no surprise that people want to leave areas that are devoid of job opportunities and cultural vibrancy, but where they go next is up for grabs. To a large extent that decision will be determined by explicit policy decisions of city ordinance officials and zoning commissions and historic preservation boards, and of the status quo bias of incumbent urban property owners. The metro areas that handle these issues best will be poised to reap the benefits in the next census.

The Surveillance State Abides

Now that the debt-ceiling nonsense is behind us (for three months or so), it’s a fine time to recall that no matter if federal spending be increased or slashed, taxes be hiked or cut, Democrats or Republicans comprise the majority, the nation commit itself to one war, two wars, three wars, al-Qaida be ascendant or irrelevant; through political paralysis, economic stagnation, military impasse…

Through it all, the Domestic Surveillance State abides, grows ever larger, ever more intrusive, the one-way ratchet forever tightens, peddling phantom protection and security at the bargain price of round-the-clock invigilation, our privacy monitored, mined, collated, stored; and we don’t much notice, and when we do, we don’t much care:

If Congress had to name laws honestly, it would be called the "Forcing Your Internet Provider to Spy On You Just In Case You’re a Criminal Act of 2011" — a costly, invasive mandate that even the co-author of the Patriot Act, Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wisc.), says "runs roughshod over the rights of people who use the Internet."

But because it’s disguised as the "Protecting Children from Internet Pornographers Act," the House Judiciary Committee approved it last week by a wide margin — even though it’s got little to do with child porn and won’t do much to protect kids.

The centerpiece of this ill-conceived law is a sweeping requirement that commercial Internet providers retain a one-year log of all the temporary Internet Protocol addresses they assign to their users, along with customer-identification information. The Justice Department says this will help track down child-porn peddlers by linking online activity and real-world identities. But the government would be able to access that sensitive data for all kinds of investigations, most of which would have nothing to do with child porn.

Traditionally, citizens in a free society are presumed innocent. If the police want to look through your computer files, the Fourth Amendment requires them to show a judge that there’s "probable cause" to suspect wrongdoing. The PCIPA turns that assumption on its head, treating every Internet user as a presumptive criminal and exploiting a serious Fourth Amendment loophole.

Read the rest here.