There are two dimensions to the Israel flotilla disaster (well there are plenty more than two but let’s focus on two). One is the tactical screw-up of the mission itself. As Matt Steinglass at DiA notes:
It’s difficult to fathom some of the decisions taken by the Israel Defense Forces in planning the interdiction. Why board the ship rather than disabling and towing it? Why use helicopters to rappel onto the deck one by one, vulnerable to the mob? If the intent was to surprise and overwhelm the passengers, why not break off the attempt when it was clear they were not surprised or overwhelmed?
Megan McArdle agrees:
It’s hard to argue that Israel needed to stage this raid in international waters to stop the looming threat of . . . um . . . men with pipes. Rather than, say, wait until the boats entered Israeli-controlled waters in the "exclusion zone" and board them (debatably) legally.
Andrew Exum notes that in planning the raid, the base assumption of the Israeli Navy should have been that those onboard the flotilla were deliberately trying to provoke a crazy, violent response. I’d say throwing a soldier thirty feet overboard is pretty good evidence of that. Why did the planners of this little Rambo excursion seem so unprepared for this liklihood?
[A]s a student of low-intensity conflict and information operations, one really does have to marvel at the incredible own goal the Israelis have just scored. The fact that Hamas and its allies didn’t even have to do a thing to earn it is what I find to be most remarkable. Not that they care what I think, but the Israelis should not be talking about the people on the aid flotilla right now. They should be examining themselves and their response and asking how they hell they fumbled this so badly.
Aside from the tactical disaster, the incident puts a spotlight on the larger point about the efficacy and morality of the Israeli blockade and trade embargo of Gaza. Peter Beinart attacks the talking point that Israel only blockades Gaza to prevent Hamas from importing and building weapons with which to kill Israeli civilians:
In reality, the embargo has a broader and more sinister purpose: to impoverish the people of Gaza, and thus turn them against Hamas. As the Israeli newspaper Haaretz has reported, the Israeli officials in charge of the embargo adhere to what they call a policy of “no prosperity, no development, no humanitarian crisis.” In other words, the embargo must be tight enough to keep the people of Gaza miserable, but not so tight that they starve.
This explains why Israel prevents Gazans from importing, among other things, cilantro, sage, jam, chocolate, French fries, dried fruit, fabrics, notebooks, empty flowerpots and toys, none of which are particularly useful in building Kassam rockets. It’s why Israel bans virtually all exports from Gaza, a policy that has helped to destroy the Strip’s agriculture, contributed to the closing of some 95 percent of its factories, and left more 80 percent of its population dependent on food aid. It’s why Gaza’s fishermen are not allowed to travel more than three miles from the coast, which dramatically reduces their catch. And it’s why Israel prevents Gazan students from studying in the West Bank, a policy recently denounced by 10 winners of the prestigious Israel Prize. There’s a name for all this: collective punishment.
The point I want to make is that tactical blunders of this sort are exactly what you’d expect from the strategic starting point outlined above. Bad strategy dictates bad tactics. If you take "no prosperity, no development, no humanitarian crisis" as your policy foundation—putting aside the breathtaking cynicism and moral bankruptcy at the heart of it—you will inevitably come to a time where chasing that untenable policy will lead you increasingly to disregard things like international opprobrium, proportionality, estrangement from allies, and effectively waging the war of public opinion against your enemies. As Exum notes above, Hamas didn’t have to do a thing to earn this prize. It was handed to them for free. Far from turning the people of Gaza against Hamas, the whole world today is condemning Israel and talking about the larger injustice of their siege on Gaza. No one is condemning Iran today. No one is condemning Hamas. No one is wondering about Palestinian intransigence on the peace process. No one is wondering about the fate of Gilad Shalit. As Exum said, it’s an own goal for Israel. And there will be others.
The Egyptians have cynically capitalized on the anti-Israel mood, announcing that they are temporarily lifting their own blockade of Gaza and reopening the border crossing at Rafah. People tend to conveniently forget about Egypt’s complicity in ensuring Gaza’s isolation, and one wonders why these pro-Palestinian activists have never sent a flotilla toward Sinai in the three years since Egypt closed the border in response to Hamas’s violent takeover of the Strip. When the necrotic despot Hosni Mubarak is earning PR points at your expense, you know your policy has become woefully derailed.
Sadly we should not be shocked when a foundational injustice begets further small injustices. We very easily decry the sporadic tactical manifestations when they occur, but they are manifestations of a deeply flawed, nay failed, strategic posture.
How shall Israel rescue itself? You are among the comforted if you think Bibi Netanyahu has the perspicacity, the political courage, the awareness for self-criticism, the foresight, the equanimity, and the strategic wisdom to chart a different course. I am not among the comforted.
