Iraqi national parliamentary elections are right around the corner. It’s no surprise that electioneering and campaigning looks a bit different in Iraq than it does in other young democracies. But there are refreshing mundane similarities when people anywhere decide to settle their political differences by empowering democratically elected representatives. Politicians are politicians, even in post-civil war sectarian tinderboxes in the heart of the Middle East.
Case in point: Prime Minister al-Maliki announced today that the government was going to reinstate 20,000 former Baathist army officers, all of whom had been put out of work in 2003 when Paul Bremmer decided to disband the Iraqi Army. This announcement a week before the election is a clear political move designed, I suppose, to curry favor with supporters of rival Shiite and secular parties and brandish Maliki’s “post-partisan” bone fides. A spokesman for the opposition Sunni coalition was skeptical, and said of the move, “This is purely a means of trying to gain more votes.”
My first thought was, Well good for him! A politician making a conciliatory, if cynical, gesture in an attempt to gain more votes? How scandalous! Next thing you know he’ll accuse al-Maliki of not relating to “real working people”. If the heart of the opposition’s complaint is that the incumbent is trying to gain more votes, I’ll take it!
Really though, how refreshingly unremarkable. A bit better than drumming up votes through state-sanctioned death squads and campaigns of intimidation and violence against political opponents and their supporters.
Though you’ll see from the rest of the article that I’ve no reason to be overly sanguine about any of this. There have been plenty of incidences of isolated sectarian reprisals, civic unrest, and allegations of corruption, electoral irregularities, and misconduct.
And this move by al-Maliki is a bit mystifying. Marc Lynch noted yesterday that thus far in the campaign al-Maliki has been wary of appearing “soft on the Baath”. Just last Tuesday the official De-Baathification committee, charged with purging the military and government of people who still harbor Saddamist loyalties (and headed by our old friend, the double-dealing charlatan Ahmed Chalabi) named hundreds more intelligence and security officers for de-Baathification. Al-Maliki doesn’t seem too concerned about that, even while he acts as the savior of unemployed former Baathists elsewhere. Lynch sees the ongoing de-baathification racket as a sign of the “degradation and politicization of Iraqi state institutions.”
Nir Rosen, who I think has spent more time in Iraq than not since the war began, has a note of optimism over at Tom Ricks’ blog. He says that even though al-Maliki is a corrupt authoritarian, large-scale sectarian violence and militia activity is over in Iraq:
It’s not about whether Iraqis are sectarian or not. They are, though the vitriol and hatred have decreased. It’s that they are not afraid of the other sect anymore. Fear is what led to the militias taking power and to the political and military mobilization along sectarian lines. There are attempts by some Shiite and Sunni parties to scare people again but in my conversations I feel it is failing. The fear is gone and the Iraqi Security Forces fill the security void, even if it’s not pretty.
This post is presenting a muddled, opaque, and insanely complicated picture of Iraqi politics, which matches my own level of understanding of things; but also, Iraqi politics is muddled and opaque and insanely complicated. Welcome to the Middle East.















